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The paper reflects on the relationship between the 
understanding of human activity which Marx 
expresses in Capital and the theoretical model of 
activity offered by an influential contemporary variant 
of Activity Theory. The paper argues that this variant 
departs significantly from Marx’s conception of 
human activity and its role in what he calls the ‘labour 
process’. In particular, Activity Theory has failed to 
distinguish between the labour process and the 
valorization process, a distinction which is 
fundamental to Capital and to Marx’s theoretical and 
political perspective more generally. The paper also 
argues that this conceptual conflation is also evident in 
the theoretical discourse of the founders of the 
Activity Theory tradition. The paper goes on to 
consider the theoretical and practical implications f 
this departure from the method and conclusions of 
Capital. 
1. Introduction1  
Are Marx’s ideas relevant to researchers in the 
cultural-historical and Activity Theory (CHAT) 
tradition today? And if so, how exactly are they 
                                                          
1 In this paper I take up once again the themes which I have 
addressed in more depth in a number of unpublished 
papers (Jones, 2003, 2004) which have been circulating 
amongst colleagues and friends for some years and hve
been the basis of conference contributions in different 
venues, including at the first ISCAR conference in Seville 
and, most recently, the symposium in Oslo organised by 
Ines Langemeyer. I would like to thank a number of 
people who have commented on them: Chik Collins, Ines 
Langemeyer, Anna Stetsenko, Andrew Brown, Seth 
Chaiklin, David Bakhurst, Jan Derry, Reijo Miettinen, 
Paul Warmington, and Colin Barker. Jones (2004) has 
now recently appeared in Russian translation as Jones 
(2009), for which I am indebted to my friend Andrey 
Maidansky. I would like to give special thanks to Ines 
Langemeyer for inviting me to participate in the Oslo 
symposium and for her help and advice with this paper. I 
would also like to express my gratitude to an anonymous 
reviewer for a most helpful and constructive commentary 
which I’m afraid I’ve been unable to do justice to fully on 
this particular occasion. 
 
Outlines • No. 1 • 2009 Breaking away from Capital? • Peter E. Jones 
 
46
relevant? These are not only interesting but also 
important questions and ones which I believe we 
must squarely address as a research community. 
No less important, but more difficult, however, is 
the follow-up question: assuming that Marx’s 
ideas are still relevant, are the aims, concepts and 
theoretical presuppositions of Activity Theory 
today consistent with his ideas? On this question, 
opinion seems to be divided amongst those 
researchers who are keen to reaffirm the Marxian 
roots and orientation of CHAT. Some scholars 
(Adler, 2006, 2007; Sawchuk, 2006) see a 
continuity and compatibility between Marx’s 
analysis of capitalist production and the analytical 
framework of Activity Theory. By contrast, others 
(Jones, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2009; Langemeyer & 
Roth, 2006; Avis, 2007; Warmington, 2008) 
detect a serious rift between Activity Theory and 
the Marxist tradition. I hope to explain here why I 
think the second group of authors has it right.2  
Of course, it could be argued that a turning 
away from Marx and, in particular, a breaking 
away from Capital, is a good move and a timely 
one. Maybe it’s time to settle accounts with 
Marxism, to bring our theory up-to-date and re-
orient ourselves on a different basis? But it is 
unclear as yet on what basis we might do this and 
what we might lose in the process. Maybe there is 
still something we can learn from Marx’s Capital, 
as Ilyenkov, one of the most frequently cited 
philosophers in the Marxist tradition, argues 
insistently (Ilyenkov, 1982).  
This paper is intended as a further contribution 
to the debate which is developing on this issue. 
                                                          
2 Newman & Holzman (1993) are probably the first authors 
to raise this issue, and in characteristically forthright 
style: "Activity theory, the psychological perspective with 
which Vygotsky is associated, partially originated with 
Marx’s radically monistic and revolutionary conception 
of activity. Yet while most contemporary activity 
theorists acknowledge Marx as, if not the only founder, 
then one of the founders of activity theory, on ourview 
most do not even remotely understand the revolutionary 
character of Marx’s practical-critical conception of 
practical-critical activity" (1993, p. 14) 
 
Specifically, I will argue that the methods and key 
concepts of one current, and very influential, 
version of Activity Theory developed by Yrjö 
Engeström and his co-workers and colleagues 
(e.g., Engeström, 1990; Engeström & Miettinen, 
1999; Miettinen, 2000), imply a significant 
departure from Marx’s Capital, and I will try to 
draw out some of the implications of that. At the 
same time, however, I will try to show that the 
seeds for such a rift were planted in the very 
conceptual foundations of the Activity Theory 
tradition and will argue that there is scope for a 
renewal and a revitalization of that tradition in a 
rediscovery of the method, conclusions and 
implications of Marx’s work and of Capital in 
particular. 
 2. Marx and the origins of 
Activity Theory 
There is no doubt that Marx’s ideas exerted a 
profound influence on Vygotsky, Rubinshtein, A 
N Leont’ev and Luria - the pioneers of cultural-
historical psychology and of Activity Theory. 
Central to that influence was Marx’s Capital 
(Marx, 1976a), for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
Marx’s characterization of human activity as our 
"species activity" – to be found on the very pages 
of Capital itself – is the very conceptual 
cornerstone of the activity-based approaches to 
psychology which are directly associated with 
Leont’ev and Rubinshtein. And, secondly, the 
very method of Capital itself, that is, its 
dialectical approach to the critical analysis of its 
subject matter (political economy) was a source of 
inspiration and a model for cultural-historical 
researchers. 
On the first issue, Engeström and Miettinen 
(1999, p. 3) argue that: 
 
”Marx’s concept of labor, or production of use 
values, was the paradigmatic model of human 
object-oriented activity for Leont’ev when he 
formulated the concept of activity. Drawing 
directly on Marx and Engels, he emphasized the 
Outlines • No. 1 • 2009 Breaking away from Capital? • Peter E. Jones 
 
47
two mutually dependent aspects of mediation in 
labor activity”.  
 
The two aspects of mediation have to do with 
the fact that labour is "a process mediated by tools 
… and at the same time mediated socially" 
(Leont’ev, 1981, p. 208 in Engeström & 
Miettinen, 1999, p. 4).3   
On the second issue, that of methodology, we 
all know that attempts have been repeatedly 
made, from early on in our tradition, to emulate 
Marx’s analytical approach. For example, we are 
all familiar with Vygotsky’s remark: 
 
”I do not want to find out [about the nature of] the 
psyche for free – by clipping a few quotes – I want 
to learn from the whole of Marx’s method how to 
build a science, how to approach the investigation 
of the psyche” (Vygotsky in Van der Veer & 
Valsiner, 1991, p. 153) 
 
In order to do so, Vygotsky argued, it was 
necessary ”to create one’s own Capital” (in Van 
der Veer & Valsiner, 1991, p. 153). Vygotsky’s 
extensive, and famous, presentation of his 
methodology of ”analysis into units” (Vygotsky, 
1986) is, arguably, one of the main fruits of his 
attempt to create such a psychological Capital 
under the influence of Marx’s approach to the 
critique of political economy in which he begins 
from the commodity as the "cell" (or "germ cell") 
of value.4  Marx’s method, known as the "method 
of ascent from the abstract to the concrete", 
                                                          
3 At the risk of sounding pedantic, there are, from the very 
outset, grounds to challenge the validity of Leont’ev’s 
interpretation of Marx’s concept of human labour. For 
Marx, labour is not "mediated socially"; it is, quite 
simply, "species activity", i.e. it is what humans do. Nor 
is it "mediated by tools"; tools belong to its "simple 
elements", as we shall see below. To say that labour is 
mediated by tools is a bit like saying that walking is 
mediated by legs. 
 
4 Although whether or not Vygotsky’s "word meaning" 
could really be considered as a "cell" in the dialectical 
sense is another question (Jones, 2002). 
 
explored in detail by Ilyenkov (1982) is 
considered by many authors to be a fundamental 
principle in Activity Theory research and 
theoretically informed practice. In recent years, as 
we shall see below, appeal has been made to 
Marx’s general methodological principle in order 
to justify the use of a germ cell or unit of analysis 
of activity itself. 
There is much more to Capital’s influence, of 
course, than these general philosophical and 
methodological principles. Leont’ev, for instance, 
explored, if somewhat abstractly, the implications 
of Marx’s analysis of capitalist production for 
concrete psychological investigation on the 
premise that: 
”the psychological features of the individual 
consciousness can only be understood through 
their connections with the social relations in 
which the individual becomes involved" (1977, p. 
191). "At first glance", he argued, ”the immersion 
of research in this intricate picture may appear to 
divert it from the task of specific psychological 
study of the consciousness, and lead to the 
substitution of sociology for psychology" (1977, 
p. 191).  
 "But", he goes on, "this is not the case at all" 
(1977, p. 191) since "outside the system of these 
relations (and outside social consciousness) the 
existence of individual mentality, a psyche, in the
form of consciousness is impossible" (1977, 
p.190). Psychology, in other words, cannot escape 
sociology; the psychological is inseparable from 
the social: 
 
”although a scientific psychology must never lose 
sight of man's inner world, the study of this inner 
world cannot be divorced from a study of his 
activity and does not constitute any special trend of 
scientific psychological investigation” (1977, p. 
202). 
 
Capitalist production, he argued, had very 
specific consequences for human social relations 
and activity and, necessarily therefore, for 
Outlines • No. 1 • 2009 Breaking away from Capital? • Peter E. Jones 
 
48
psychological functioning and personality 
generally: 
 
”The bulk of the producers, finally, were converted 
into hired labourers, whose only property was their 
capacity to work. The objective conditions of 
production were now opposed to them as another’s 
property. They could therefore live and satisfy their 
vital wants only provided they sold their labour 
power, i.e. alienated their labour. But labour was 
the most intrinsic content of their life; they 
consequently had to alienate the very content of 
their life” (Leont’ev, 1981, p. 252). 
 
Furthermore, the "incompleteness and 
inadequacy of consciousness" which results from 
this alienated condition ”cannot be eliminated in 
any way other than through a practical change in 
the objective conditions that engender this 
inadequacy” (1981, pp. 260-261).  
But if the influence of Capital is clear at this 
programmatic level, what is less clear is whether 
Leont’ev’s principal theoretical innovation, 
namely his concept of activity as the basis for 
concrete psychological analysis, was consistent 
with Marx’s own view of human activity and its 
relationship to the capitalist labour process.5   
Let us now explore in some detail these two 
aspects of the link between Activity Theory and 
Capital: 1) activity as a concept and 2) activity as 
a unit of analysis.  
3. Activity as a concept 
For Marx, the category of activity was central 
to an understanding of what human beings do, of 
what they are, and what they can and will make of 
themselves. By "activity" in this general sense, 
Marx means "the life of the species", "life 
activity", "life engendering life" which he 
describes as "free, conscious activity", "man’s 
species-character" (1976a, p. 86). Marx refers to 
activity in this sense by various terms, including 
                                                          
5 For an important critique of Leont’ev’s position from a 
different perspective, see Stetsenko (2005). 
"labour", "the productive life", "work", "the 
process of labour" or "the labour process" (1976a, 
p 86, p. 998). It is crucial, then, to recognise that 
Marx’s terms "labour process" or "work" in this 
context do not refer to the particular, everyday 
activities in which people in a particular society, 
in a particular age, are engaged. "Work", as Marx 
puts it: 
 
”is the eternal natural condition of human 
existence. The process of labour is nothing but 
work itself, viewed at the moment of its creative 
activity” (1976a, p. 998).  
 
Labour, in this sense, ”is a simple process 
between man and nature” whose "simple elements 
remain the same in all social forms of 
development" and which is not to be identified 
with ”the process of social production” (Marx, 
1909, p. 1030) in the sense of a specific form or 
mode of production (e.g. capitalist production). 
These ”simple elements of the labour process” 
(Marx, 1976a, p. 284) or, what is the same thing, 
”the universal features of the labour process” are 
”independent of every specific social 
development” (1976a, p. 998). Marx describes 
these ‘simple elements’ as follows: 
”(1) purposeful activity, that is work itself, (2) the 
object on which that work is performed, and (3) the 
instruments of that work” (1976a, p. 284).  
Again, it is important to note that Marx is not 
describing any particular, historical action; 
"activity" here is not equivalent to what we would 
call a "job".6  These "general features of the 
labour process" are  
 
”all independent of every historical and specifically 
social conditioning and they remain valid for all 
possible forms and stages in the development of the 
processes of production. They are in fact 
immutable natural conditions of human labour. 
                                                          
6 Cf Newman & Holzman (1993, p. 44): "our day-to-day 
societally determined and commodified 'activities' are not 
activity at all in the Marxian, historical sense." 
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This is strikingly confirmed by the fact that they 
hold good for people who work independently, i.e. 
for those, like Robinson Crusoe, who work not in 
exchange with society, but only with nature. Thus 
they are in fact absolute determinants of human 
labour as such, as soon as it has evolved beyond 
the purely animal” (Marx, 1909, pp. 1021-1022). 
 
Thus, Marx’s description of human labour, of 
our "species character", is not a description of, 
say, capitalist production any more than it is a 
description of feudal production: it says nothing 
at all about the one or the other, except that in 
both cases the labour process must be taking place 
otherwise everybody would be dead. But if this 
description tells us nothing at all about capitalis 
production specifically, then it can hardly serve as 
a model or framework either for the analysis of 
specifically capitalist production - capitalist 
"activity", we might say – or of the motives, 
capacities and abilities of individuals within 
capitalist society.  
Marx’s efforts in Capital are directed at 
showing what is historically specific to, unique to, 
the capitalist mode of production and at 
demonstrating thereby the necessarily transient 
nature of capitalist production. In capitalist 
production the labour process is there but it is 
fused with another process – with an activity in 
quite a different sense - which Marx refers to as 
"the valorization process" or "a process of 
creating value" (1976a, p. 293).  
Capitalist production involves the production 
of commodities. These are things that are useful, 
and necessary to sustain life, but also have a value 
(expressed in their price). The capitalist process 
of production, then, is "the unity of the labour 
process and the process of valorization" (Marx, 
1976a, p. 304). These two processes (or 
"activities") are not the same thing and must not 
be confused, conflated or equated. Indeed, they 
are opposite, antithetical processes: 
 
”In the labour process looked at purely for itself the
worker utilizes the means of production. In the 
labour process regarded also as a capitalist process 
of production, the means of production utilize the 
worker” (Marx, 1976a, p. 1008).  
 
Marx explains in more detail: 
 
”In the labour process the worker enters as worker 
into a normal active relationship with the means of 
production determined by the nature and the 
purpose of the work itself. He takes possession of 
the means of production and handles them simply 
as the means and materials of his work…The 
material conditions of labour now enter into a 
normal unity with labour itself; they form the 
material, the organs requisite for creative activity” 
(1976a, p. 1007).  
He goes on: 
 
”But production is also a process of valorization, 
and here the capitalist devours the labour-power of 
the worker, or appropriates his living labour as the 
life-blood of capitalism. Raw materials and the 
object of labour in general exist only to absorb the 
work of others, and the instrument of labour serves 
only as a conductor, an agency, for this process of 
absorption” (1976a, p. 1007). 
 
It would be quite wrong, then, according to 
Marx to attribute to the "activity" of capitalist 
production, or indeed to any "activity" 
specifically conditioned by capitalist production 
relations, the attributes of the labour process as 
such, of  "free, conscious activity" which is our 
"species character". For exactly this reason, it 
would be wrong, according to Marx, to simply 
and uncritically apply the term "activity" in the 
sense of the labour process to the "activities" 
involved in capitalist production or to any 
concrete, historically specific productive activity 
or sphere of work. To do so would be to hide the 
historically specific and transient features of the
social production process behind the simple, 
universal, eternal, natural, "absolute determinants 
of human labour as such" (Marx, 1909, see 
above). It would be to disguise the process of 
valorization - the "activity" in which some people 
are exploited by others - as a "simple relation 
Outlines • No. 1 • 2009 Breaking away from Capital? • Peter E. Jones 
 
50
between man and nature" (Marx, 1909, see 
above).  
It is absolutely central to Marx’s work in 
Capital, indeed it is central to the whole of his 
being, to distinguish between the two sides or 
aspects of the capitalist production process – viz. 
human labour as such and the valorization 
process. His indictment of the bourgeois political 
economists is based on their "failure to 
comprehend the labour process as an independent 
thing and at the same time as an aspect of 
capitalist production" (Marx, 1976a, p. 1000). 
And much of Capital is devoted to showing how 
and why these two aspects are confused in the 
minds of political economists (as well as 
everybody else) and the consequences of 
"confusing the appropriation of the labour process 
by Capital with the labour process itself" (1976a, 
p. 998). Marx argues, for instance, that mixing up 
the features of the labour process as such with 
specific features of the capitalist labour process is 
"a very convenient method by which to 
demonstrate the eternal validity of the capitalist 
mode of production and to regard Capital as an 
immutable natural element in human production 
as such" (1976a, p. 998).  
This confusion is, I believe, evident in the very 
foundations of Activity Theory and evident, 
consequently, in some of its contemporary 
variants, although the intention is certainly not to 
"demonstrate the eternal validity of the capitalist 
mode of production". As Engeström and 
Miettinen (1999, p. 3), noted earlier, argue: 
"Marx’s concept of labor, or production of use 
values, was the paradigmatic model of human 
object-oriented activity for Leont’ev when he 
formulated the concept of activity". In other 
words, it would appear that Leont’ev, instead of 
approaching activity from the standpoint of its 
socio-historical specificity, proceeded to construct 
a full-blown theory of activity out of what Marx 
describes as ‘independent of every specific social 
development’ (Marx, 1976a, p. 998). It would 
seem that he assumed that what Marx sees as an 
aspect of the total social production process – an 
aspect which is in violent conflict with other 
aspects - can be taken as a general 
characterization of the process overall and of all 
the separate ‘activities’ which make it up. In other 
words, Leont’ev has constructed a general model 
of any kind of human activity whatsoever out of 
determinations which Marx intended to apply 
only to activity in the sense of the labour process 
– the "simple relation between man and nature". 
To do so, Leont’ev had to add in a few more 
concepts to the abstract determinants Marx gave, 
including the distinction between "collective 
activity and individual action" (Engeström and 
Miettinen, 1999, p. 44), an addition which 
muddies the theoretical waters still further.  
We find exactly the same approach in 
Davydov (1999)7  who also takes Marx’s concept 
of activity (in the sense of the labour process) to 
apply indifferently to any particular social 
activity: 
 
”Thus one can regard activity as an initial category 
that determines the specific character of people’s 
social being. The social laws can reveal themselves 
only in activity and through it” (1999, p. 41).  
 
But activity in Marx’s sense, we should recall, 
does not at all "determine the specific character of 
people’s social being", but is, rather, "independent 
of every historical and specifically social 
conditioning" (Marx, 1909, see above). What 
"determines the specific character of people’s 
social being" under capitalist conditions (at least 
in the most general terms) is not labour, 
productive activity, or (what is a different name 
for the same thing) the "labour process" as such 
but the capitalist labour process ("the 
appropriation of the labour process by capital") 
which is a different thing entirely. And that is 
                                                          
7 Davydov argues that "Marx’s philosophical and 
sociological concepts should be kept separate from his 
more specific economic and political views" (1999. pp. 
39-40). I could not disagree more and would argue that
this statement betrays some degree of misunderstanding 
of Marx’s ideas in general and of Capital in particular. 
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why the features of activity in Marx’s sense 
cannot be applied, or be used to model, the 
specific properties of "activity" within capitalist 
conditions (or, indeed, in the conditions of any 
specific social system).  
Exactly the same confusion is to be found in S 
L Rubinshtein’s approach (1999), I believe, 
although I will not try to demonstrate that here. 
And I believe it is also to be found in the 
conceptual models of activit’ to be found in the 
work of Yrjö Engeström and colleagues which I 
will examine more closely in the next section. 
Engeström, I should emphasise, has done much 
to stress the continuity between activity theory 
and Marx’s ideas. He has also acknowledged the 
relevance of Marx’s work in Capital for theory 
and practice today, and, in particular, for our 
understanding of the internal contradictions 
within "activity systems", as the following 
passage makes clear: 
 
”The primary inner contradictions reflect the basic 
contradiction characteristic to the socio-economic 
formation as a whole. In capitalism, the basic 
contradiction is the dual nature of commodities, the 
tension between the use value and the exchange 
value. In different activity systems, this 
fundamental tension appears in different forms, as 
the primary contradiction of that particular activity. 
This primary contradiction resides in each 
component of the activity system. For example, in 
bureaucratic and rationalized medical work 
activity, doctors typically experience a constant 
latent tension between their role as gatekeepers and 
cost-efficient producers on the one hand, and as 
healers or consultants on the other hand” (1990, p. 
84).  
 
Nevertheless, there are grounds for concern in 
this interpretation of Marx’s work. First of all, the 
basic contradiction in capitalism is not the dual 
nature of commodities. While capitalist 
production necessarily involves the making of 
commodities, the making of commodities does 
not make capitalist production: ”The fact that it 
produces commodities does not distinguish it 
from other modes of production” (Marx, 1909, p. 
1025).  
Capitalist production, rather, ”is marked from 
the outset by two peculiar traits” (Marx, 1909, p. 
1025). First of all, ”the laborer himself acts in the 
role of a seller of commodities” so that ”wage 
labor is the typical character of labor” (1909, p. 
1025). It follows that ”the relation between wage 
labor and capital determines the entire character 
of the mode of production” (1909, p. 1025, my 
emphasis). The second ”specific mark of the 
capitalist mode of production” is ”the production 
of surplus-value as the direct aim and 
determining incentive of production. Capital 
produces essentially capital, and does so only to 
the extent that it produces surplus-value” (Marx, 
1909, p. 1026, my emphasis). In other words, as 
Ilyenkov puts it: 
 
”The real historical beginning of the development 
of capital, as Marx showed, was the point at which 
Capital began to build its body out of the unpaid-
for labour of the wage worker. Only at this point 
does its specific concrete history begin” (1982, p. 
214).  
 
Commodities, then, are a prerequisite for 
capitalist development, belonging to the 
””antediluvian premises of capitalist 
development, to its “prehistoric” conditions. As 
concrete historical forms of being of capital, 
reflecting in their movement its specific history, 
they are products of capital itself”” (Ilyenkov, 
1982, p. 211, my emphasis).  
It would appear, then, that the reasons why 
Marx began his analysis in the first volume of 
Capital with the commodity have been forgotten 
or misunderstood: the basic contradiction of 
capitalist production is not that within the 
commodity as such - the commodity is not even 
specific to capitalist production! I return to the 
point in the next section.  
Incidentally, this also means that medical 
practice, in some European countries at least, does 
not provide a typical instance of the workings of 
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capitalist production although it inevitably 
depends on both a supply of commodities and on 
wage-labour. Indeed, public health services, 
generally speaking, do not provide cases of 
capitalist production at all to the extent that they 
are spheres of consumption of goods and services 
rather than of production of surplus value. The 
relatively benign atmosphere and circumstances 
to be found within some systems of public health 
care, when viewed narrowly, do not, therefore, 
reflect the ”basic contradiction” of capitalism and, 
for that reason, can hardly be taken as a ‘model’ 
of specifically capitalist economic processes. 
(Nor, of course, given their social specificity, can 
they be taken as cases or examples of activity in 
general). But public health care systems, like 
public education systems, operate, of course, 
within the overall system of capitalist economic 
and political relations and, therefore, cannot be 
properly understood without concrete analysis of 
their place within these relations. Their position n 
this system naturally makes them a constant site 
of political and economic contestation. In 
particular, they are a tempting target for 
appropriation by private Capital and the struggle 
to defend them must, therefore, take account of 
these deep and powerful motive forces of 
capitalist production.8   
4. Activity as a unit of analysis 
Much has been made of Marx’s analytical 
method in Capital in terms of its relevance for 
understanding human activity and its problems 
and prospects. Ilyenkov’s work (1982), dedicated 
to explicating and defending this method – the 
method of "ascent from the abstract to the 
concrete" – is well known and celebrated within 
the CHAT tradition. This method is often referred 
to as one involving "germ-cell models" where 
"the most famous instance of this kind of analysis 
                                                          
8 See Monbiot (2001) for a careful exposé of the UK Labour 
government’s mission to privatize the National Health 
Service and the public education system. 
 
is the identification of commodity as the germ-
cell of the capitalist socio-economic formation" 
(Engeström, 1993, p. 53). Sometimes the term 
"unit of analysis" (echoing Vygotsky’s famous 
exposition of his own methodology in Vygotsky, 
1986) is used in reference to the "germ-cell" 
method, as in Miettinen (2000, p. 112): 
 
”Marx traced the germ cell of a capitalist society 
(commodity and value), and then drew the whole 
system of concepts and determinations to uncover 
the developmental dynamics of capitalism. The 
unit of analysis is the capitalist society as a 
whole”.9   
 
However, despite the reference to Marx’s 
procedure in Capital, Engeström and Miettinen 
have proposed a new ‘unit of analysis’ for 
contemporary Activity Theory, one which will 
allow us to grasp the contradictions and 
complexities in today’s working practices and to 
appreciate ”the creative and dynamic potential of 
concrete work process and technologies” which 
”remains underdeveloped” in Marx’s work 
(Engeström and Miettinen, 1999, p. 5). That new 
unit of analysis can be found ”in the concept of 
object-oriented, collective, and culturally-
mediated human activity, or activity system” 
(Engeström and Miettinen, 1999, p. 9). Such a 
unit of analysis will be ”a concrete work activity” 
(Miettinen, 2000, p. 114) such as, say, a medical 
practice, health care system, adult education 
provision, or a scientific laboratory. In order to 
uphold Marx’s "germ cell methodology" it seems, 
then, that we have to part company with Marx’s 
own germ cell, namely the commodity. Let us 
take a step back and consider what is at stake. 
If such concrete work activities are, indeed, 
units of analysis (without worrying about what 
they could be units of analysis of) then it is a 
wonder why Marx himself didn’t adopt this 
approach. Why did he not begin, in Capital, by 
breaking down contemporary capitalist society 
                                                          
9 See Jones (2004, 2009) for detailed critical commentary 
on these passages. 
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into its activity ‘units’ - here is tailoring, here 
watch-making, match-making, here candlestick-
making, here is teaching, here banking, here 
surgery, here is factory work, here politics, etc – 
and then proceed to join them all up and examine 
the connections between them? The reason is 
simple: to do so would be to incorporate into our 
basic conceptual "units" the confusion which 
Marx is making every effort to avoid.  
On this ‘unit’ approach, the specific and 
‘peculiar’ traits of capitalist production  noted 
above - the traits which determine the entire 
character of the society in which capitalist 
relations obtain - have been removed from the 
outset and cannot be coherently put back. For 
example, to call the activity taking place under 
capitalist conditions within the match factory 
"match-making" is already to be guilty of 
"confusing the appropriation of the labour process 
by Capital with the labour process itself" (Marx, 
1976a, p. 998). Matches may be being produced 
by the workers in the match factory, but the 
crucial product is not matches but surplus value. 
As Marx explains: 
 
”The capitalist labour process does not cancel the 
general definitions of the labour process. It 
produces both product and commodity. Labour 
remains productive as long as it objectifies itself in 
commodities, as the unity of exchange-value and 
use-value. But the labour process is merely a 
means for the self-valorization of capital” (Marx, 
1976a, p. 1039, my emphasis). 
 
Marx’s point is that you must begin from the 
commodity, not from the labour process or from 
some abstract definition of activity, in order to 
understand capitalist production. Why? Because 
the labour process is there (commodities are 
produced and consumed as useful things) but it is 
already caught up by and subordinated to another 
process, viz. the process of producing value. It is
the commodity - this socio-historically specific 
form of the product of labour – which is a 
necessary condition for capitalist production and 
no other starting point will lead you to capital, i.e. 
to the "peculiar traits" of specifically capitalist 
production. Indeed, if you do not go through the 
analytical journey which Marx makes – otherwise 
known as "the method of ascent from the abstract 
to the concrete" – the peculiar complexities and 
mystifying appearances of capitalist production 
will bamboozle you. Marx argues: 
  
”Vulgar economy really does nothing else but to 
interpret, in doctrinaire fashion, the ideas of 
persons entrapped in capitalist conditions of 
production and performing the function of agents 
in such production, to systematize and to defend 
these ideas. We need not wonder, then, that vulgar 
economy feels particularly at home in the estranged 
form of manifestation, in which economic 
conditions are absurd and complete contradictions, 
and that these conditions appear so much more 
self-explanatory to it, the more their internal 
connection is concealed. So long as the ordinary 
brain accepts these conceptions, vulgar economy is 
satisfied. But all science would be superfluous, if 
the appearance, the form, and the nature of things 
were wholly identical”. (1909, p. 951) 
 
Marx’s own work, therefore, particularly the 
third volume of Capital, is focussed on: 
  
”locating the concrete forms growing out of the 
movements of capitalist production as a whole and 
setting them forth. In actual reality the capitals 
move and meet in such concrete forms that the 
form of the capital in the process of production and 
that of the capital in the process of circulation 
impress one only as special aspects of those 
concrete forms. The conformations of the capitals 
evolved in this third volume approach step by step 
that form which they assume on the surface of 
society, in their mutual interactions, in competition, 
and in the ordinary consciousness of the human 
agencies in this process” (Marx, 1909, pp. 37-8). 
 
To begin, then, from "concrete work 
activities"’ as units of analysis is to depart from 
Marx’s Capital – from its conclusions as well as 
its method. It is to begin and end with those forms 
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of activity which are manifest "on the surface of 
society" rather than to seek to understand the 
historical specificity – and, therefore, the 
transitory quality – of those forms of social 
intercourse from which these surface forms are 
produced and which these forms also disguise and 
conceal. The motor of the whole system of 
production – the pumping out of surplus value 
from living labour – is entirely absent on the 
surface as are, consequently, the complex and 
contradictory connections and interactions which 
are driven by capital independently of the will and 
wishes of individuals and which bind all 
activities, indeed all people throughout the world, 
together in alienated and alienating conditions of 
life and work. Thus, the apparently concrete work 
'activity' of a particular professional sphere or 
branch of the social division of labour is actually 
the most abstract and, therefore, inappropriate 
place to look for a clear understanding of the 
inner contradictions of social life.  
To compound the problem, we see that the 
terms in which this new unit of analysis is 
described – object-oriented, collective, and 
culturally-mediated human activity, or activity 
system – reproduce in somewhat modified form 
the simple elements of the labour process as Marx 
describes in Capital. That is, the terms describing 
work as "free, conscious activity", human 
"species character", "productive life-activity", etc 
are to be applied to empirical instances of work 
under conditions of capitalist production, the very 
thing Marx warns against. Thus, to be very blunt, 
taking "concrete work activities" or "activity 
systems" as units of analysis is, in Marx’s terms, 
to introduce the categories and methods of 
"vulgar economy" (or bourgeois sociology) into 
the cultural-historical tradition through the back 
door. 
The attributes of human activity, or the labour 
process, as Marx understood it, have been 
mistakenly made into a model for the analysis of 
work ‘activities’ which are part of the fabric of 
the capitalist production process. As a result, 
specifically capitalist labour processes are 
normalized and even naturalized in the sense of 
being wholly disguised by general, trans-
historical labels. In this way, both the specificity 
and transitoriness of capitalist production 
relations are concealed from view and the task of 
freeing the labour process – human activity – 
from the chains of Capital cannot be posed. 
Langemeyer and Roth (2006), Avis (2007), 
and Warmington (2008) have also approached the 
problem of the continuity between the Marxist 
tradition and Activity Theory today in critical 
fashion and have drawn conclusions which 
complement the analysis presented here. Avis 
(2007, p.175), for example, argues that ”the 
notion of conflict and social antagonism is 
underplayed” in Engeström’s Activity Theory, 
with the consequence that "the notion of 
transformation becomes truncated". Warmington 
(2008, p. 17) calls for a renewal ”of activity 
theory’s theoretical and methodological 
framework” on the basis of an understanding of 
Marx’s work. The peril, as he explains, ”is that, in 
current activity theory, Marxist notions of 
contradictions in the labour process become 
domesticated in the service of “soft” system 
adaptation”.  
Paul Adler (2006, 2007), on the other hand, 
finds Engeström’s Activity Theory to be ”a useful 
framework” for providing ”a more fine-grained 
account of the production process” from his own 
”paleo-Marxist’ point of view” (Adler, 2007, p. 
1329). In order to demonstrate this, Adler begins 
from a model of what Marx calls “production in 
general”, which is ‘trans-historical insofar as it 
does not acknowledge any more specific, 
historically-bounded, “concrete” determinations’ 
(2007, p. 1330). The next step is as follows: 
 
”We move from this abstraction towards the 
concrete by overlaying on this model a set of 
determinations that mark production as specifically 
capitalist. Of these, the most fundamental is the 
contradiction between use-value and exchange-
value of which the commodity is the germ. This 
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contradiction is reflected in each of the elements of 
the labour process” (2007, p. 1330). 
 
However, Adler’s proposal to begin from 
"production in general" is, once again, at odds 
with Marx’s own method of beginning from the 
commodity. Despite Adler’s cogent exposition of 
key aspects of Marx’s analysis (including the 
distinction between labour process and 
valorization process) and his forthright 
commitment to affirm the contemporary relevance 
of Marx’s ideas, there are, therefore, in my view, 
certain key problems in his attempt to reconcile 
these ideas with the methodology of Activity 
Theory.  
The first problem is that Adler takes "the 
contradiction between use-value and exchange-
value" as the most fundamental contradiction 
within capitalist production whereas Marx, as we 
have already seen, takes the relation between 
wage labour and capital as fundamental. The 
consequence of this is that the production of 
surplus-value becomes disguised or camouflaged 
within labour process terminology rather than 
being made visible as "the direct aim and 
determining incentive of production" (Marx, 
above).  
The second problem manifests itself in the 
view that the concreteness of capitalist production 
can be grasped by "overlaying … a set of 
determinations that mark production as 
specifically capitalist" (Adler, 2007, p. 1330) ont 
the determinations of the labour process in 
general. For Marx, by contrast, the relationship 
between the labour process and the valorization 
process is not at all one of "overlaying". Marx, 
instead, speaks of the "appropriation of the labour 
process by capital" (1976a, p. 998) or of the 
"exploitation of a social labour process" (1976b, 
p. 449) in capitalist production. It follows then, 
that one cannot talk about those activities 
involved in the "exploitation of a social labour 
process" in the conceptual terms applicable to the 
labour process itself. Such a process of 
exploitation not only "transforms the nature of the
labour process and its actual conditions" (Marx, 
1976a, pp. 1034-5) but, in doing so, creates all 
kinds of "activities" which are completely 
parasitic on, or violently antithetical to, the labour 
process and which should not be dignified by 
being described in the same conceptual terms.  
In essence, I believe that Adler’s proposal 
involves a misunderstanding of aspects of Marx’s 
method of "ascent from the abstract to the 
concrete". In fact, ascending from the abstract 
does not at all mean beginning from an 
abstraction – from an abstract, general idea, 
definition or concept to which "concrete"  
determinations are then progressively added. As 
Marx himself puts it: 
 
”In the first place, I do not proceed on the basis of 
“concepts” … What I proceed from is the simplest 
social form in which the product of labour in 
contemporary society manifests itself, and this is as 
“commodity”. That is what I analyse, and first of 
all to be sure in the form in which it appears” 
(1976b, p. 214, emphasis in original). 
 
Thus, Marx’s "ascent from the abstract" 
begins, however paradoxical this may seem, with 
"the 'commodity' – the simplest economic 
concretu"’ (1976b, p. 215) and builds from there 
to reconstruct the logic of the development and 
dynamic of capitalist production.  
Adler may well disagree with these points, 
however, and a thorough debate around these 
issues between all interested parties would 
therefore make for an important step forward in 
the theoretical development of the Activity 
Theory tradition.  
5. Implications and prospects 
Although this paper has concentrated on what 
may appear to be esoteric issues of theory and 
methodology, I would hate to create the 
impression that these are matters of theory alone. 
Marx’s distinction between the labour process and 
the valorization process is not an academic hair 
splitting exercise. He wants to show how human 
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potential – the potential to make our world a 
world truly fit for a human way of life – is present 
within capitalist production processes but is 
locked up, constrained, diverted and perverted by 
being subordinate to another process in which the 
many are exploited by the few. As Mészáros 
explains: 
 
”To Marx, in contradistinction to the reformer, 
economic investigations do not serve as theoretical 
grounds of an economic action, but of a political 
one. He is interested in problems of economy only 
insofar as they reveal the complex hierarchy of the 
structure that he wants to see positively 
transcended” (Mészáros, 1970, pp. 126-7).   
 
And further: 
”The point about labour producing itself and the 
worker as a commodity is of the utmost importance 
for the understanding of Marx's position on the 
question of supersession. Since the very foundation 
of human existence and of all human attributes is 
the purposive productive activity which has ... a 
relative priority over the concept of man, if one 
cannot present labour in a historical framework, 
showing the actual process in which purposive 
productive activity becomes wage-labour (or 
"alienated labour"), one has no ground for 
envisaging a supersession” (Mészáros, 1970, p. 
125). 
 
Marx, then, contrary to the claims by 
Engeström and Miettinen (1999, p. 5) did not fail 
to appreciate or to investigate ”the creative and 
dynamic potential of concrete work process and 
technologies”. On the contrary. What Marx did 
was to show that our human potential, our very 
"species character", was to be found in "the 
creative and dynamic potential of concrete work 
process and technologies". But, and here is the 
crucial thing, he showed that this creative force - 
which he called the labour process - must, at all 
costs, be distinguished from the appropriation of 
this process by capital. And this theoretical 
distinction was in itself nothing but the 
recognition of the practical possibility of releasing 
that creative and dynamic potential from the 
destructive and dehumanising clutches of 
capitalist production. 
This is not to deny either that our everyday 
working environments, as Engeström and 
colleagues rightly point out, offer a wealth of 
opportunities for learning and invention. But what 
people learn varies very much according to 
circumstance. Certainly, people are constantly 
learning new ways – more efficient and more 
humane perhaps - to work with one another. But 
at the same time, some people turn up for work to 
learn that they are out of a job or have had their 
pay cut. Some learn that their efforts to improve 
the working and living conditions of their fellow 
human beings will end in arrest, incarceration, or 
even worse. Some learning takes place despite the 
general inhumanity of our circumstances. But 
some learning takes place because of it. The 
formation and growth of trade unions and the 
international labour movement is therefore itself a 
monumental tribute to the power of workplace 
learning. 
In conclusion, Marx understood human activity 
not as a unit of analysis of empirically given 
activities within capitalist society, in the sense of 
a theoretical model of such activities. His 
conception of activity was an affirmation of the 
human potential for creative, life-affirming 
communion and transformation which had grown 
up inside, and partly because of, capitalist 
production, and, for that reason, his perspective 
entailed a critique of dominant views of the 
nature, history and fate of capitalist production. 
His conception of activity was both the criterion 
against which political and economic actions 
could be measured and the aim of human 
emancipation from class division and 
exploitation. It was not a model of activity under 
existing conditions but a call to arms, a call for 
social transformation, which was heard by the 
pioneers of the cultural-historical tradition and 
which, as Stetsenko (2008) and Stetsenko and 
Arievich (2004) have argued, is of vital 
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significance for the development of our tradition 
today.   
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